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DOES THE ORIGINAL INTENT COUNT: 
THE PAST AND THE PRESENT IN THE U.S. 
SUPREME COUR T’S DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
“The Supreme Court is a constitutional convention in continuous session”
Woodrow Wilson
INTRODUCTION
One can say that American society is more conservative than liberal, as Americans 
are proud of their history and traditions, and seek to preserve the most impor-
tant symbols of the nation. The highest position accorded to George Washington 
from among all the other U.S. presidents, the ‘united-we-stand’ symbolism of the 
American flag, as well as the worship of the U.S. constitution prove that the begin-
ning of American statehood is an especially significant moment for most contempo-
rary U.S. citizens. Despite the imperfection of the first President and the ambiguities 
of the federal Constitution, Americans still believe that the events and heroes of the 
late eighteenth century are close to ideal, as they gave birth to the greatest nation in 
the world. A positive social attitude towards the Constitution seems surprising, as 
the document confronts issues which have caused lively discussions concerning the 
scope of its protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the society and to 
the powers of the government. One should acknowledge, however, that most of the-
se discussions have been initiated by specific interpretations of the document by the 
Supreme Court of the United States.
Since its landmark decision of 1803 (Marbury v. Madison),1 the Court has been 
responsible for the power of judicial review; that is, determination of the constitution-
1 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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ality of acts created by the other branches of government, a power which, in practice, 
has led to a continuous process of interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. Therefore, 
if someone undermines or criticizes the meaning of particular phrases or clauses with-
in the document, it means condemning the decision-making process of the Supreme 
Court, not the substance of the document itself. The Constitution, consisting of sev-
en articles and twenty-seven amendments, may be found in almost every American 
home. What most American homes do not have is a thick constitutional law textbook. 
Such a textbook, full of judicial precedents originating from constitutional interpreta-
tion, might give a full answer to the question about the historical and contemporary 
meaning of the supreme laws and principles of the United States. Without judicial 
interpretation, the Constitution is vague and ambiguous, as it was intended only that 
it confront the general issues of the state’s operation and social relations.
Since 1803 one can observe a never-ending process of constitutional interpreta-
tion imposed by the Justices of the Supreme Court, who have reshaped the meaning 
of many important political, social and cultural issues which have influenced the lives 
of the American people. This interpretation has led to numerous precedents referring 
to the powers of the government (federal-state relations, the scope of the separation of 
powers and the checks and balances system) and the powers of the people (the scope of 
the Bill of Rights guarantees, the role of the state in criminal and civil trials, the princi-
ples of democracy, the rule of law and equality). When one considers the last two hun-
dred years of judicial review, there is hardly any area which has remained untouched by 
the influential hand of the federal judiciary: even individual rights to privacy have been 
recently confronted by the Justices. The question must be posed as to whether the ide-
alized heroes of the founding-era, so often praised by American society, would be fond 
of the contemporary meaning of the document of 1787, redefined by hundreds of 
subsequent lawyers and legal theorists. Therefore, the main purpose of this paper is to 
analyze the decision-making process of some of the nineteenth and twentieth century 
Supreme Courts in order to find out what the main direction of the Justices’ adjudica-
tion was: whether they decided to interpret the Constitution in accordance with the 
ideals of the Founding Fathers (so-called original intent) or whether they preferred to 
take into consideration the changing social and political reality. There have been many 
different methods of constitutional interpretation undertaken by the U.S. Supreme 
Court, and it is crucial to find out which one has been the most common method used 
by the Justices. The answer to this question may reveal the American attitude towards 
history, tradition, and fundamental values. The Constitution addressed these issues, 
but they have been frequently modified over the course of the past 200 years.
THE CREATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
The main reason for the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, which gathered more 
than fifty representatives of the states, was to revise the Articles of Confederation. 
The Articles turned out to be imperfect, creating a confederation in which the divi-
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sion of powers proved to be impractical, due to the weak federal government, diffe-
rences between the rich and poor states, economic crisis, and the lack of national ju-
dicial institutions.2 The delegates, named the Founding Fathers,3 among whom there 
were many distinguished statesmen, decided to prepare a new document that would 
organize the states into a federal republic. Despite many differences concerning the 
division of power, the role of the federal government and the relations among states, 
the Convention turned out to be a big success: the delegates created a constitution 
which, after its ratification by most of the states, became the fundamental document 
of the new country in 1788. The United States Constitution, as the supreme law of 
the land, regulated the most important issues concerning the political system and 
social relations, and implemented in seven brief articles six main principles: demo-
cracy, the rule of law, federalism, the supremacy of the Constitution, separation of 
powers and the checks and balances system.4 All of these principles have influenced 
the shape and character of the country, while the separation of powers doctrine and 
the checks and balances system seem to be crucial for understanding the mechanisms 
that govern American political reality.
The delegates to the Philadelphia Convention repeatedly emphasized that in cre-
ating a government capable of promoting the public good, the Constitution must at 
the same time protect rights and respect the principles of justice. In order to achieve 
this, there should be no institution that would gain more power than the others. 
According to one of the most famous Justices, Louis Brandeis, ‘the doctrine of sepa-
ration of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency, 
but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.’5 However, a pure separation of pow-
ers system would provide no protective weapons to enable members of each branch 
to check potential abuses of members in the other branches. That is why the checks 
and balances system was created, which did not contradict the separation of powers 
doctrine, but rather complemented it. The three branches of government were given 
special means by which they were able to partially participate in the work of the oth-
er branches. The weakest branch in this respect was the judiciary, which according 
to the constitutional provisions set out in Article Three could act as a mediator in 
legal disputes and declare which laws applied to a particular case. There was no refer-
2 J.J. Patrick, R.M. Pious, D.A. Ritchie, The Oxford Guide to the United States Government, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford–New York 2001, pp. 30-31.
3 It is impossible to list all of the famous names of the Convention, but there was an active group of 
leaders, such as George Washington, Edmund Randolph, James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, John 
Adams, Benjamin Franklin, George Mason, to name a few.
4 More about the principles of U.S. Constitution read: A.R. Amar, America’s Constitution: 
A Biography, Random House, New York 2006; W. Burnham, Introduction to the Law and Legal 
System of the United States, West Publishing Co., St. Paul 2004; A.E. Farnsworth, Introduction to the 
Legal System of the United States, Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry (N.Y.) 1996; J.M. Feinman, 
Law 101: Everything You Need to Know About the American Legal System, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford–New York 2000; R. Tokarczyk, Prawo amerykańskie, Zakamycze, Kraków 1998; P. Laidler, 
Konstytucja Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki. Przewodnik, Kraków 2007.
5 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
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ence in the Constitution to the ability to control the activities undertaken by other 
branches of government; that is, the executive and legislature.
Two important issues need to be raised, as they are mutually exclusive: first, the 
attitude of the Founding Fathers towards the Constitution; and second, the scope of 
the separation of powers doctrine. According to most of the Framers, the highest law 
in the country was probably imperfect, but nothing more could be done at that time. 
In the words of Benjamin Franklin:
‘[…] I agree to this Constitution with all its faults, if they are such; because 
I think a general Government necessary for us, and there is no form of Government 
but what may be a blessing to the people if well administered, and believe farther 
that this is likely to be well administered for a course of years, and can only end in 
Despotism, as other forms have done before it, when the people shall become so 
corrupted as to need despotic Government, being incapable of any other. I doubt 
too whether any other Convention we can obtain, may be able to make a better 
Constitution. For when you assemble a number of men to have the advantage of 
their joint wisdom, you inevitably assemble with those men, all their prejudices, 
their passions, their errors of opinion, their local interests, and their selfish views. 
From such an assembly can a perfect production be expected? […]’6
The Founding Fathers agreed to establish a document which was general in 
substance for two main reasons: first of all, it was impossible to cover all of the is-
sues, as the authors of the Constitution were not able to predict the direction of 
future social and political relations, and secondly, if they tried to list all of the issues 
which ought to be confronted by a young state, they would have created a code, not 
a constitution. Such an approach was confirmed by Chief Justice John Marshall in 
his famous opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland: ‘[…] We must never forget that it is 
a Constitution we are expounding […] intended to endure for ages to come, and 
consequently to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs […]’7 As a result 
of the general character of the Constitution, the document had to be interpreted 
from time to time in order to adjust it to the changing social, political and econom-
ic reality. Meanwhile, it is more than obvious that by equipping the judicial branch 
with the least powers of all the three branches of government, the Founding Fathers 
did not intend to grant the power of judicial review to the Supreme Court of the 
United States.8 In other words, the Framers did not designate any institution as re-
sponsible for the interpretation of the Constitution! This paradox became visible 
after a few years of American statehood, and it was therefore only a matter of time 
until it would be properly defined.
6 B. Franklin, Benjamin Franklin’s Final Speech in the Constitutional Convention, 20 January 2009, at 
<http://www.nv.cc.va.us/home/nvsageh/Hist121/Part2/franklin.htm>.
7 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
8 Most of them regarded judicial review as an important power, but hesitated, however, to write it 
into the Constitution. See R. Hodder-Williams, The Politics of the US Supreme Court, George Allen 
& Unwin, London 1980, p. 5.
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THE ESTABLISHMENT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Among the Framers there was only one person who raised the issue of constitutio-
nal interpretation by stating that the Supreme Court should gain more power than 
it had been granted in the Constitution. Alexander Hamilton, one of the authors of 
The Federalist Papers, felt that ‘judges should do their duty as faithful guardians of 
the Constitution’. In the Federalist nos. 78 and 79 he stated that ‘the interpretation 
of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts […] The courts must 
declare the sense of the law. They are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited 
Constitution against legislative encroachments.’9 Although the Framers had omitted 
the power of judicial review in the original text of the Constitution, sixteen years 
later the judiciary was enriched by this power, which became a new element of the 
checks and balances system. Importantly, however, judicial review was not inserted 
into the Constitution in the form of an amendment, but was instead created by 
a precedent of the Supreme Court.
If there were one case that could be called fundamental and paramount to the 
U.S. constitutional system, without doubt it would be Marbury v. Madison. There 
would be no contemporary shape or understanding of U.S. constitutional law with-
out the Supreme Court’s decision of 1803. The Marbury case provided the basis for 
the exercise of judicial review, allowing the judiciary to exercise the power to declare 
acts of other branches of government null and void, if they were inconsistent with 
the federal Constitution. What it really meant, however, was the beginning of ju-
dicial interpretation of the Constitution, which has now been exercised for more 
than 200 years, making judges the most powerful and influential actors in the U.S. 
political and legal scene. This case influenced not only the scope of American con-
stitutional law, but it also allowed the courts to control other branches of govern-
ment, changing the primary meaning of the checks and balances system.10 The judi-
ciary was to become stronger and very often superior to the executive and legislative 
branches of government, gaining more power than the Framers had agreed to grant 
it during the Constitutional Convention.
The case was decided in 1803 by the six-member Supreme Court with the fa-
mous John Marshall serving as a Chief Justice. He, above anyone else in the country, 
wanted to emphasize the vital and unique role of the federal judiciary in the U.S. 
governmental system, and therefore he had to find the fairest solution to the case. 
Although this landmark decision was delivered in 1803, the facts that led to the dis-
pute took place a few years earlier. In the 1800 presidential elections, the Federalist 
Party candidate, President John Adams, was defeated by Thomas Jefferson who was 
to take office in March 1801. Adams used his remaining time as president to appoint 
more than forty federal judges to judicial posts created earlier by Congress, in which 
9 A. Hamilton in: The Federalist Papers, Penguin Putnam, New York 1999, nos. 78-79.
10 W. Burnham, Introduction to the Law…, pp. 9-18.
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the Federalist Party had the majority. However, the nomination, as well as confirma-
tion by the Senate, was undertaken in the last two days of Adams’ term. The final 
act of the appointment process, the delivery of signed and sealed commissions, was 
the responsibility of the secretary of state, John Marshall. Marshall, who had already 
been chosen for the post of the Supreme Court’s Chief Justice by John Adams, deliv-
ered only some of the documents; the next day Thomas Jefferson began his presiden-
tial term. The new secretary of state, James Madison, refused to deliver the missing 
commissions, treating them as incomplete and void appointments. Among these un-
delivered commissions was one of William Marbury, who was appointed to the post 
of justice of the peace in the District of Columbia. Marbury sued James Madison in 
the Supreme Court in order to force him to deliver the commission.
Before reaching the final verdict, Justices had to answer questions concerning 
the validity of Marbury’s appointment, his possible legal remedy, and the power of 
the Court to hear the case. John Marshall was aware of the fact that a ruling against 
Madison would lead to a serious constitutional conflict between the judiciary and 
the executive, which might eventually undermine the Court’s position. On the other 
hand, the Chief Justice wanted to emphasize the vital and unique role of the federal 
judiciary in the U.S. governmental system, and therefore he had to find the fair-
est solution to the case. The result – the creation of the power of judicial review – 
proved significant and binding for future American judges, officers of the executive 
and members of the legislative houses, as well as many generations of U.S. citizens.11 
What Marshall really did, however, was to open the possibility of the judicial branch 
applying the changing standards of social and political relations to particular clauses 
of the Constitution, but it has always remained the Court’s decision as to whether to 
confront some of these issues or not.
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM V. JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
Before addressing the question of the proper method of constitutional interpretation 
conducted by the Supreme Court of the United States, it is important to acknowled-
ge that there have been two major approaches towards the scope of judicial review in 
history. The first, called judicial activism, means a ‘philosophy of judicial decision-
making whereby judges allow their personal views about public policy, among other 
factors, to guide their decisions, usually with the suggestion that adherents of this phi-
losophy tend to find constitutional violations and are willing to ignore  precedent’.12 
The second, called judicial restraint, encourages the judges to limit their exercise of 
judicial review, thus upholding most of the new laws as being consistent with the 
Constitution. The judicial restraint doctrine appeals to the necessity of maintaining 
11 P. Laidler, Basic Cases in U.S. Constitutional Law: The Separation of Powers, Jagiellonian University 
Press, Kraków 2005, p. 34.
12 B.A. Garner (ed.), Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition, Thomson/West, St. Paul (MN) 2004.
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the principle of stare decisis; that is, respecting old precedents and displaying a re-
luctance to create new precedents.13 Both approaches depended upon the individual 
attitude of Justices towards their role and mission as members of the highest judicial 
tribunal in the country. By closely examining the nineteenth and twentieth century 
decision-making process of the Supreme Court, one can easily name a few represen-
tatives of both approaches. The most famous judicial activists in the Court’s histo-
ry were John Marshall, Roger B. Taney, Earl Warren, Warren Burger and William 
H. Rehnquist, whereas among the opponents of that approach were Felix Frankfurter, 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis Brandeis and John Marshall Harlan.
Although nobody used the term judicial activism at the beginning of the nine-
teenth century, it is obvious that in creating the power of judicial review, John 
Marshall ensured that he would become the prime mover of the activist approach. 
Nearly all of the decisions of the Marshall Court confronted the power of judicial 
review and broadened it, starting with the landmark decision of 1803. Such cases 
as Fletcher v. Peck14 (judicial review of state law), McCulloch v. Maryland (neces-
sary and proper clause) and Gibbons v. Ogden15 (commerce clause) confirmed the 
Chief Justice’s approach towards the unique role of the judiciary. Marshall’s succes-
sor, Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, was not given the opportunity to become so active. 
However, some of the decisions of the Court in the 1840s and 1850s followed the 
pattern of broad judicial review. This was probably most visible in the 1857 decision 
in Dred Scott v. Sandford, where the Justices determined that slavery could be indi-
rectly derived from the Constitution, thus throwing a rock into the stream of racial 
tensions between the North and the South of the country.16 Due to this controversial 
precedent, the Supreme Court found itself in the middle of political activities which 
led to the outbreak of the Civil War. Similarly, among the twentieth century Justices 
there were many followers of Marshall’s vision of a strong and influential judiciary. 
Certainly, three of the Chief Justices serving between 1953 and 2005 fall into the 
category of judicial activists; during these periods, their leadership influenced the 
Court’s decisions, which had the effect of broadening the scope of judicial review. 
The Warren Court was responsible for many controversial and far-reaching decisions 
shaping the meaning of fundamental rights of the accused in criminal trials, estab-
lishing such constitutional principles as the exclusionary rule (Mapp v. Ohio),17 the 
Miranda warnings (Miranda v. Arizona)18 and the probable cause (Terry v. Ohio).19 
The Court also set new boundaries when it came to the various rights and freedoms 
of individuals, such as the equal protection clause (Brown v. Board of Education of 
13 J.J. Patrick, R.M. Pious, D.A. Ritchie, The Oxford Guide…, p. 192.
14 10 U.S. 87 (1810).
15 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
16 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
17 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
18 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
19 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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Topeka)20 and the right to privacy (Griswold v. Connecticut).21 The next Chief Justice, 
Warren Burger, despite possessing a different ideology and vision of the Court than 
that of Earl Warren, adopted a similar approach, which was reflected in the famous 
abortion dispute (Roe v. Wade)22 and the separation of powers case (United States 
v. Nixon),23 where Burger reaffirmed Marshall’s approach towards judicial suprem-
acy. Finally, the last of the three subsequent Chief Justices, William H. Rehnquist, 
proved active in some respects; that is, in commerce clause issues (United States 
v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison)24 and the right to privacy (Planned Parenthood 
v. Casey, Vacco v. Quill or Lawrence v. Texas).25 There is no doubt, however, that the 
most far-reaching example of judicial review was cast by the Rehnquist Court in the 
Bush v. Gore decision, which determined the outcome of the 2000 presidential elec-
tions in the United States.26
In contrast to judicial activism, the approach of the limitation of judicial review 
has been established by a few prominent Justices who have realized that the exer-
cise of this power by the Supreme Court may lead to a violation of the constitu-
tional principles of the separation of powers and checks and balances. Probably the 
best recognized representative of judicial restraint was Justice Felix Frankfurter, who 
served on the Supreme Court between 1939 and 1962. He considered the courts 
to be institutions which should not overturn the results of legislative judgment for 
any reason short of obvious conflict with a clear constitutional prohibition. Felix 
Frankfurter showed his approach in several cases concerning the interpretation of the 
Bill of Rights in connection with the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause. 
While most of the Justices affirmed the necessity of incorporation of the fundamen-
tal guarantees of individuals into the states, Justice Frankfurter rejected such a proc-
ess mainly in cases referring to freedom of religion, freedom of speech and the rights 
of the accused in criminal trials.27 Moreover, his opinion in Baker v. Carr led to 
a limitation of the scope of judicial power by the adoption of the doctrine of politi-
cal question.28 Frankfurter was influenced by one of his predecessors, Oliver Wendell 
20 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
22 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
23 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
24 514 U.S. 549 (1995); 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
25 505 U.S. 833 (1992); 521 U.S. 793 (1997); 593 U.S. 558 (2003).
26 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
27 Frankfurter’s self-restraint approach was visible in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 
586 (1940); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); 
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) or Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). More 
on this topic: C. Tomlins (ed.), The United States Supreme Court: The Pursuit of Justice, Houghton 
Mifflin Company, Boston 2005, pp. 266-268.
28 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The Supreme Court should not answer political questions because the U.S. 
Constitution has committed decision-making on this subject to another branch of the federal govern-
ment; there are inadequate standards for the Court to apply; or the Court feels it is prudent not to inter-
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Holmes, who, serving as an Associate Justice, proved to be less active than most of 
the Justices in the 1910s and 1920s. However, Holmes’s opinions do not clearly 
and unequivocally refer to the need for judicial restraint, as he was inconsistent in 
his views towards the scope of freedom of speech, often changing his attitude from 
feeling that the Court should be less active to more active and vice versa.29 It was 
rather Justice Louis Brandeis, who served before Frankfurter, who presented a more 
determined approach towards judicial deference. In the case Ashwander v. T.V.A. he 
wrote a famous concurring opinion stating that: ‘the Court will not pass upon the 
constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding, it will not an-
ticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it, it 
will not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than the precise facts to which 
it is applied.’30 Brandeis’s opinion is often regarded as a self-restraint imposed on the 
Court by the Justices themselves, and the means proposed by him established the 
democratic boundaries of judicial review. The last of the above-mentioned Justices 
(and earliest) who sought to limit judicial powers was John Marshall Harlan, who 
served between 1877 and 1911. Despite the fact that Harlan is not considered to be 
a precursor of judicial restraint, his dissenting opinion in Lochner v. New York tends 
to be regarded as a leading example of the reluctance to broaden the meaning of the 
Constitution and the role of the judiciary.31
As one may observe, judicial activism or restraint has not been connected with 
the ideologies of particular Justices, since there have been both conservative and lib-
eral active and restrictive judges. On the other hand, political ideology had an impact 
on the decision-making process of the above-mentioned Justices, who decided to 
adjudicate actively in particular cases because of their attitude towards a confronted 
issue, such as the powers of the government or the scope of the rights and freedoms 
of individuals. Similar conclusions may be derived while analyzing various methods 
of interpretation undertaken by different generations of American Justices.
DIFFERENT METHODS OF INTERPRETATION
There are three main elements which influence the decision-making process of 
a Justice, thus affecting his method of interpretation of a legal document: his politi-
cal ideology (often combined with party-affiliation), his approach towards the role 
fere. Thanks to the political questions doctrine, the Court shaped its own role in the political process. See 
F.N. Baldwin, ‘Due Process and the Exclusionary Rule: Integrity and Justification’, University of Florida 
Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 2 (1987), p. 512. See also W. Lasser, The Limits of Judicial Power: the Supreme 
Court in American Politics, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill 1988, pp. 161-245.
29 Holmes created the clear-and-present danger test in Schenck v. United States, 247 U.S. 49 (1919) 
but he limited his activism a few months later in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
Such inconsistency was characteristic for Holmes’ adjudication in the 1920s.
30 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
31 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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of the court (activism or restraint), and the substance of the reviewed case (there are 
some topics which should be reviewed, and some others which should not). From 
a different perspective, one may assume that there are two basic approaches which 
help us to understand the judicial decision-making process: a legal approach (that is, 
an effort to find a legally suitable answer to the case), and a policy-based approach, 
stemming from the personal policy preferences of a judge.32 A considered analysis 
of the most important decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court leads to the conclusion 
that despite the existence of the legal and extra-legal approach towards the making 
judicial decisions, there are at least five methods of interpretation undertaken by the 
Justices of the Court:
– historical interpretation – referring to the ‘original intent’33 of the Framers and 
to the binding character of former precedents of the Court which, according to the 
doctrine of stare decisis, should not be changed;
– textual interpretation – based on the ‘plain meaning’ of the language and 
wording of particular constitutional clauses or phrases;
– structural interpretation – concerning the most important assumptions to-
wards the structure and character of the government, as well as the social and politi-
cal system;
– doctrinal interpretation – made with regard to theoretical and doctrinal prin-
ciples and rules, which were established in the former judicial decision-making 
process;
– reasonable interpretation – taking into account more than one method of in-
terpretation, which depends on the issue covered by a particular case.
All of the above-listed methods of interpretation seem vital for a contemporary 
understanding of the Constitution. However, if the role of history in the Court’s 
adjudication must be examined, one should focus on the substance of the historical 
interpretation. Since it is the main area of analysis, the most space will be devoted to 
the character and meaning of this particular method, while it is important to under-
stand the basic assumptions of the rest of the methods.
The textual interpretation refers to the exact meaning of the language contained 
in the reviewed document. From the Supreme Court’s perspective it is the language 
of the Constitution which has the highest value in the U.S. legal system, and there-
fore some of the Justices decide to search for the ‘plain meaning’ of particular phrases 
and clauses of the supreme law of the land. On the one hand it has led to the defining 
of the exact words used by the Framers, which has made the interpretation closer to 
the original intent approach. On the other, however, the determination of the mean-
ing of a constitutional clause has often been applied in consistency with changing 
32 J.A. Segal, H.J. Spaeth, S.C. Benesh, The Supreme Court in the American Legal System, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge–New York 2005, p. 19.
33 To read more about original intent, see D. Barton, Original Intent: the Courts, the Constitution, and 
Religion, WallBuilder Press, Aledo 2004; L.W. Levy, Original Intent and the Framers’ Constitution, 
Ivan R. Dee, Chicago 2000; K.E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, 
Original Intent, and Judicial Review, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence 2001.
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social and political relations. John Marshall, in Gibbons v. Ogden, devoted a lot of 
time simplifying the meaning of the word ‘commerce’ from the commerce clause of 
Article One, referring to the intent of the authors of the document.34 But more than 
one hundred years later the Supreme Court introduced a different kind of definition 
of the same clause, using Marshall’s approach to commerce only in part, and deter-
mining the scope of interstate commerce in accordance with trade and commercial 
relations of the 1930s and 1940s.35 The problem with textual interpretation occurs, 
however, because of four significant reasons: the lack of precision of the English lan-
guage, the need to find out the intent of the authors of the specific provision, the 
possibility of conflict between two similar phrases of one document, and the occur-
rence of two identical words with different meanings in the same legal source.36
Structural interpretation is very often connected with historical or textual inter-
pretation, but it mainly refers not to the literal meaning of a clause, but to a broader 
understanding of the structure of institutions established by the clause. Therefore, 
this method may be applied in cases which concern the relations among various 
governmental officers and institutions, on both the federal and state level. Two of 
the most vital decisions in this respect are United States v. Nixon and United States 
v. Morrison. In the first, Chief Justice Warren Burger used the separation of powers 
doctrine to determine the scope of presidential executive privilege and the possibil-
ity of the judicial branch entering into the sovereignty of the executive.37 The second 
case referred to the constitutionality of the independent counsel, an institution cre-
ated in order to investigate possible violations of law occurring within the executive 
branch of government. Despite the fact that the majority of Justices confirmed the 
legality of the independent counsel’s operations, it is the dissenting opinion of Justice 
Antonin Scalia which serves as a pure example of the structural interpretation of the 
Constitution. Justice Scalia emphasized the necessity of the Court to preserve the 
separation of powers doctrine as the main constitutional principle, and independent 
counsel did not fit into the proper structure of the American government.38 Over 
time, Scalia’s dissent was used as one of the justifications of the termination of the 
institution’s existence in 1999 by the U.S. Congress. The weakness of the structural 
method is manifested in its rare application, as not all of the disputes decided by the 
Supreme Court refer to the character and structure of government.
Doctrinal interpretation belongs to one of the most used methods of interpre-
tation of cases in civil-law systems, but it does not play such a role in common law 
countries. American jurisprudence pays less attention to the theoretical and doctrinal 
34 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
35 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parish, 300 
U.S. 379 (1937); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) or Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 
(1942).
36 J.A. Segal, H.J. Spaeth, S.C. Benesh, The Supreme Court…, p. 24.
37 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
38 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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outcomes of a case, focusing on the practical aspects of the dispute, as is typical in 
precedential reality. There are, however, examples of cases in which the reference to 
doctrine seems more common and helpful for the Court. Most of the disputes con-
cerning freedom of religion are decided in accordance with one of the two theoretical 
perspectives offered by the Justices: separationist and accomodationist. Both perspec-
tives assume the necessity of the preservation of the secular character of the state, but 
they offer different understandings of the relations between state and church. The 
separationists interpret the First Amendment broadly, stating that it prevents the 
government from having any authority over religion. In practice, according to the 
followers of this perspective, any kind of governmental interference with religious 
institutions and other religious issues is forbidden. The accomodationist perspective 
refers to a narrower interpretation of the First Amendment and sets fewer limitations 
on the government with regard to the establishment clause. Accomodationists per-
ceive possible cooperation between the state and church in building a common good 
and general welfare.39 Both approaches have laid the foundations for the interpreta-
tion of the freedom of religion clause of the First Amendment, which has become the 
doctrinal background of such landmark cases as Engel v. Vitale, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
Wallace v. Jaffree and Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.40 There are hardly any other types 
of cases in which the Supreme Court reaches for theoretical and philosophical jus-
tification of its decision-making process. It is also obvious that the doctrine plays 
only a partial role in determining the scope of free exercise and free establishment 
clauses, as both textual and historical methods of interpretation are equally used by 
the Justices.
Finally, the reasonable approach concerns disputes in which the Court decides to 
apply all or most of the known and used methods of interpretation. Sometimes it is 
difficult to undertake only one approach which would fully determine the meaning 
of certain legislation or action, thus the Justices weigh the usefulness of other meth-
ods, such as historical, textual, structural or doctrinal. Analysis of some of the land-
mark Supreme Court cases leads to the conclusion that over time there have been 
more decisions based on the reasonable method of interpretation. The complexity of 
contemporary disputes creates the possibility for the Justices to refer on the one hand 
to the historical meaning of constitutional clauses, and on the other, to the changing 
social and political relations. The Court tries to balance between the present and the 
past, thus establishing timeless precedents. A problem occurs, however, when the re-
viewed case concerns controversial issues of constitutional law, which reveal Justices’ 
attitudes towards these issues. This problem is especially acute with regard to the 
right to privacy issues, which constitute a conflict between the historical and modern 
approaches towards interpretation of the supreme law of the land. The effects of such 
problems are analyzed below.
39 See D.H. Davis, ‘Separation, Integration, and Accommodation: Religion and State in America in 
a Nutshell’, Journal of Church and State, Vol. 43, No. 1 (2001), pp. 5-17.
40 370 U.S. 421 (1962); 403 U.S. 602 (1971); 472 U.S. 38 (1985); 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
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HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION
There have been many examples of the application of historical interpretation by 
the Supreme Court, especially in the first period of the Court’s adjudication, at the 
time of the Marshall Court. When John Marshall began his mission in the highest 
judicial tribunal in the country, as one of the Founding Fathers he was aware of the 
initial meaning of the Constitution as it had been established during and after the 
Philadelphia convention. Thus it was obvious which of the methods of interpreta-
tion would be offered by Marshall’s Court during his thirty-four years of service. 
Despite the fact that at that time there was not a great deal of US history upon which 
to draw, the Justices nonetheless confirmed the historical approach of the Court in 
most of the landmark decisions made between 1801 and 1835, referring to the in-
tent of the Framers. For example, in McCulloch v. Maryland, John Marshall wrote the 
famous statement determining the scope of the powers of the federal government, as 
viewed by him and his Court:
‘[…] We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the government are limit-
ed, and that its limits are not to be transcended. But we think the sound construc-
tion of the constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion, with 
respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into execu-
tion, which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the 
manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the 
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly 
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit 
of the constitution, are constitutional […]’41
Marshall’s approach, referring to the original intent of those who shaped the 
Constitution, was undertaken numerous times by subsequent Courts in the twenti-
eth century, proving that such a method bore the test of time and was equally appli-
cable one hundred as well as more than one hundred and fifty years later. In Lochner 
v. New York the Court stated that:
‘[…] It is a question of which of two powers or rights shall prevail – the power 
of the state to legislate or the right of the individual to liberty of person and free-
dom of contract. The mere assertion that the subject relates, though but in a remote 
degree, to the public health, does not necessarily render the enactment valid. The 
act must have a more direct relation, as a means to an end, and the end itself must 
be appropriate and legitimate, before an act can be held to be valid which interferes 
with the general right of an individual to be free in his person and in his power to 
contract in relation to his own labor […]’42
As similar approach was visible in United States v. Nixon, where Chief Justice 
Burger praised his great predecessor John Marshall by referring to the doctrine of ju-
41 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
42 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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dicial review established in Marbury v. Madison. In reality, the 1803 case seems to be 
the first in which historical interpretation was broadly offered. Despite the fact that 
Marshall lacked specific constitutional provisions concerning the establishment of 
judicial review, he referred to the intent of the Framers, who created the supremacy 
clause of the Constitution and gave the power to guard it to the judiciary:
‘[…] The judicial power of the United States is extended to all cases arising under 
the constitution. Could it be the intention of those who gave this power, to say that, 
in using it, the constitution should not be looked into? That a case arising under the 
constitution should be decided without examining the instrument under which it 
arises? This is too extravagant to be maintained. In some cases then, the constitution 
must be looked into by the judges. And if they can open it at all, what part of it are 
they forbidden to read, or to obey? […]’43
Therefore, Marshall assumed that the interpretation of the Constitution by the 
Supreme Court originated from the character of the document, which lacked any di-
rect provisions in this respect. In reality, Marbury v. Madison belongs to a pantheon 
of cases of which one can say that they rest upon various methods of interpretation 
(reasonable interpretation), which will be proved later in this paper. The historical 
approach is clearly noticeable in other parts of the earlier-mentioned McCulloch deci-
sion, when the Court derived the power of the people of the United States from the 
original decisions of the Philadelphia convention:
‘[…] From these conventions, the constitution derives its whole authority. The 
government proceeds directly from the people; is “ordained and established”, in the 
name of the people; and is declared to be ordained, “in order to form a more perfect 
union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, and secure the blessings of liberty 
to themselves and to their posterity.” The assent of the states, in their sovereign capac-
ity, is implied, in calling a convention, and thus submitting that instrument to the 
people. But the people were at perfect liberty to accept or reject it; and their act was 
final. It required not the affirmance, and could not be negatived, by the state govern-
ments. The constitution, when thus adopted, was of complete obligation, and bound 
the state sovereignties […] The government of the Union, then (whatever may be 
the influence of this fact on the case), is, emphatically and truly, a government of the 
people. In form, and in substance, it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by 
them, and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their benefit […]’44
The Marshall Court is the institution which used the word intent the most of-
ten in its history of adjudication. In almost every single case of constitutional sig-
nificance, the Supreme Court under the leadership of John Marshall referred to the 
original ideas of the Founding Fathers. This is obvious in the wording of the Cohens 
v. Virginia opinion: ‘We must endeavor so to construe the provisions as to preserve 
the true intent and meaning of the Constitution.’45 It was also apparent in McCulloch 
43 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
44 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
45 19 U.S. 264 (1821).
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again: ‘That the intention of the framers of the Constitution in this respect might 
not be misunderstood, this rule of interpretation is expressly declared in the tenth 
article of the amendments.’46
The late nineteenth century and twentieth century Court’s jurisprudence did not 
present the same attitude towards the word ‘intent,’ although there have been many 
decisions in which such a phrase occurred. However, the meaning of intent referred 
rather to the purpose of particular legislation which was established, thus influenc-
ing the powers of the government or the rights of individuals. The main role of the 
Court was to determine the constitutionality of legislation or specific action under-
taken by the government (federal or state) as well as certain individuals. If such legis-
lation or action violated the rights and liberties of the people, then the Justices had to 
find a compelling interest of the state or any other valid purpose which allowed it to 
stay in force.47 Therefore, by examining the rules and principles of the Constitution, 
the Court determined the real and reasonable intent of the limitation of specific 
rights or freedoms of individuals or the power of the government. For example, in 
cases which shaped the scope of the commerce clause, one could read:
‘[…] The fact that an article is manufactured for export to another state does not 
of itself make it an article of interstate commerce, and the intent of the manufactur-
er does not determine the time when the article or product passes from the control 
of the state and belongs to commerce. This was so ruled in Coe v. Errol, (116 U.S. 
517, 1886) […] And again, in Kidd v. Pearson, (128 U.S. 1, 1888) […] it was held 
that the intent of the manufacturer did not determine the time when the article or 
product passed from the control of the state and belonged to commerce, and that, 
therefore, the statute, in omitting to except from its operation the manufacture of 
intoxicating liquors within the limits of the state for export, did not constitute an 
unauthorized interference with the right of congress to regulate commerce […]’48
Similarly, in cases determining the powers of the executive:
‘[…] The government says the phrase “continue in office” is of no legal signifi-
cance and, moreover, applies only to the first Commissioners. We think it has sig-
nificance. It may be that, literally, its application is restricted as suggested; but it, 
nevertheless, lends support to a view contrary to that of the government as to the 
meaning of the entire requirement in respect of tenure; for it is not easy to suppose 
that Congress intended to secure the first commissioners against removal except for 
the causes specified and deny like security to their successors. Putting this phrase 
aside, however, the fixing of a definite term subject to removal for cause, unless there 
be some countervailing provision or circumstance indicating the contrary, which 
here we are unable to find, is enough to establish the legislative intent that the term 
is not to be curtailed in the absence of such cause. But if the intention of Congress 
that no removal should be made during the specified term except for one or more of 
46 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
47 J.E. Nowak, R.D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law, West Group, St. Paul 2000, p. 778.
48 United States v. E.C. Knight & Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
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the enumerated causes were not clear upon the face of the statute, as we think it is, it 
would be made clear by a consideration of the character of the commission and the 
legislative history which accompanied and preceded the passage of the act […]’49
Most often, however, the intent of the legislator and of the people has been at 
stake when the Supreme Court has adjudicated in disputes concerning the violation 
of individual rights and freedoms. Without finding a constitutionally-based justifi-
cation of the limitation of specific powers, the Justices could not affirm the binding 
character of the reviewed law. Thus, the Court determined the intent of the person 
who indulged in certain types of speech, creating the so-called clear-and-present dan-
ger test in 1919, the bad tendency test in 1927 and the imminent lawless action test 
in 1969.50 The scope of protection of other kinds of speech has also been defined by 
searching for the legitimate intent of the speaker, which concerns the fighting words 
doctrine, obscenity and symbolic speech.51 It is not only freedom of speech, however, 
where such an approach has been introduced. Most of the cases regarding freedom 
of religion from the establishment clause perspective have determined the purpose of 
the legislator who was prohibited from establishing any state-based control over re-
ligion. For example, in the famous Lemon v. Kurtzman decision, the Supreme Court 
negated the possibility of governmental financial aid to any institutions with a reli-
gious affiliation, by examining the intent of the legislators:
‘[…] Inquiry into the legislative purposes of the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island 
statutes affords no basis for a conclusion that the legislative intent was to advance re-
ligion. On the contrary, the statutes themselves clearly state that they are intended to 
enhance the quality of the secular education in all schools covered by the compulsory 
attendance laws. There is no reason to believe the legislatures meant anything else. 
A State always has a legitimate concern for maintaining minimum standards in all 
schools it allows to operate. As in Allen, we find nothing here that undermines the 
stated legislative intent; it must therefore be accorded appropriate deference […]’52
As one can observe, history has been present numerous times in the decisions of 
various Supreme Courts. Not always, however, have these values prevailed over the 
necessity of applying new standards of interpretation to the changing social, political 
and economic reality. To fully understand the basis for the main reasons directing the 
Justices in their decision-making process, one should examine thoroughly the func-
tioning of the stare decisis principle. It may reveal a proper perception of means and 
instruments which influence the adjudication of the contemporary Supreme Court, 
and it may give an answer to the difficult question of the necessity of preserving the 
original intent of the Framers.
49 Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
50 These doctrines were established respectively in cases: Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); 
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) and Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
51 The cases concerning the above-mentioned types of speech were: Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 
U.S. 568 (1942); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) and Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 
(1989).
52 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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DOES THE ORIGINAL INTENT COUNT ANYMORE?
The doctrine of stare decisis which is typical for the common law system refers to 
the Latin phrase stare decisis et quieta movere, which means: let the decision stand.53 
It holds that courts should follow the principle of law enunciated in previous deci-
sions by the highest court within its jurisdiction, assuming that the principle is rele-
vant to the current decision and makes sense in contemporary circumstances.54 The 
doctrine was established in Medieval England and later spread to other common 
law countries, imposing on judges the necessity of following earlier created prece-
dents. Despite the fact that the principles of the doctrine are taught in law schools 
in the United States, and that the judges are bound by decisions made by higher 
courts, they are not bound by their own precedents. This allows for the possibili-
ty of overturning a former decision of the court and applying a new rule consistent 
with the changing social, political and economic circumstances. In this respect the 
U.S. Supreme Court should follow its earlier precedents. However, the Justices are 
not bound by them and may modify or even overturn them. Such situation seems 
explicable in the case of flawed precedents which are in reality inconsistent with the 
Constitution. On the other hand, if no opportunity for creating new precedents exi-
sted, the role of the Supreme Court would be diminished and American society wo-
uld still remain in the reality of the nineteenth century.
The doctrine of stare decisis is connected with the historical approach character-
istic for some of the Justices, but not for all. The followers of the historical method of 
interpretation have often referred to the necessity of preserving the original meaning 
of the Constitution, as well as those precedents which were established in consist-
ency with the supreme law of the land. Their reluctance towards any new principles 
and rules is understandable when the circumstances of the reviewed case resemble 
the circumstances of the earlier settled disputes. However, when Justices confront 
a situation to which none of the existing precedents can be applied, they are forced to 
create a new principle according to the modern circumstances. The biggest question 
concerns what the court should do in the case of a dispute to which, on one hand, 
the old rule may be applied, or, on the other, a new one can be established. On the 
issue of stare decisis and the historical method of interpretation, the Supreme Court 
once stated that:
‘[…] Adhering to precedent “is usually the wise policy, because, in most matters, 
it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right.” 
[…] Nevertheless, when governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned, 
“this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent.” […] Stare decisis is the 
preferred course, because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and the consist-
53 M.J. Gerhardt, The Power of Precedent, Oxford University Press, Oxford–New York 2008, p. 8.
54 J.M. Scheb, J.M. Scheb II, Introduction to the American Legal System, Thomson Delmar Learning, 
New York 2001, p. 12.
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ent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and con-
tributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process… Stare decisis is 
not an inexorable command; rather, it “is a principle of policy and not a mechanical 
formula of adherence to the latest decision.” […] This is particularly true in consti-
tutional cases, because in such cases “correction through legislative action is practi-
cally impossible.” […]’55
The application of the intent of the Framers has not always proved reasonable 
and correct. For example, original intent was used to justify the constitutional sta-
tus of slavery. As delivered by Chief Justice Robert Taney in the majority decision to 
Dred Scott v. Sandford:
‘[…] It is not the province of the court to decide upon the justice or injustice, 
the policy or impolicy, of these laws. The decision of that question belonged to the 
political or lawmaking power, to those who formed the sovereignty and framed the 
Constitution. The duty of the court is to interpret the instrument they have framed 
with the best lights we can obtain on the subject, and to administer it as we find it, 
according to its true intent and meaning when it was adopted […]’56
Slavery was banned by the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution in 1865, 
allowing the controversial precedent to last for only eight years. However, other criti-
cized decisions of the Supreme Court remained unchanged for longer periods of 
time, leading to a public discussion of their suitability and fairness. Constitutional 
protection of racial segregation lasted for more than fifty years, established by the 
Court in 1896 in Plessy v. Fergusson, and overruled in 1954 by the Brown v. Board of 
Education of Topeka decision.57
The system of checks and balances created in the 1787 Constitution seems dif-
ferent from the one existing in the twenty-first century. The proposals set out by 
the Framers did not include the power of judicial review, which emerged from the 
Marbury precedent, probably because they assumed that the governmental system 
was properly balanced. Chief Justice John Marshall used the Marbury case to equip 
the system with an institution capable of confronting the social and political reality 
with the vision of the state introduced by the Founding Fathers. He believed that 
the power of judicial review stemmed exactly from the Framers’ intent. It is unlikely, 
however, that all of the Framers would be today in favour of such a strong Supreme 
Court having the power to decide on the limits and meaning of federalism, separa-
tion of powers, competences of particular institutions, as well as controversial issues 
such as abortion, capital punishment and the rights of sexual minorities. On the 
other hand, is it really important to return nowadays to the original intent of the 
Constitution, as social, economic and political life has changed significantly? The 
United States has grown in strength and length, the population is about eighty times 
larger than during the Founding era, the territory is more than five times larger, 
55 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
56 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
57 163 U.S. 537 (1896); 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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the civilization and economy are far more advanced. Stare decisis is good justifica-
tion for preserving past values in the case of minor changes within the society, but 
after 220 years of struggle for a better democracy and broader freedom, American 
society is a lot different than at the beginning of U.S. statehood. James Madison, 
Alexander Hamilton and Benjamin Franklin probably did not think about abortion, 
school prayers, affirmative action or euthanasia, but all of these issues have had to be 
confronted by the Supreme Court. As the final interpreter of the Constitution, the 
Court has had the possibility, and also the duty, to shape the scope of certain powers 
of the government and freedoms of the society. No matter if Justices decided to im-
pose historical interpretation or dared to create a new precedential reality, no matter 
if they were more or less active, no matter if the result proved to be more conservative 
or liberal – the power of judicial review has put the Supreme Court in the middle of 
political tensions. And even if the Justices applied a narrower approach towards the 
judicial role in constitutional interpretation, which was clearly proposed by Justice 
Owen Roberts,
‘[…] When an Act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as not con-
forming to the constitutional mandate the judicial branch of the government has only 
one duty – to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute 
which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the former […]’58
they could still be criticized for adopting a too narrow approach to a dispute 
which requires the application of a different method of interpretation. In this re-
spect, whether the Court refers to the original intent of the Framers or decides to 
modify the existing precedents, it does not change the social and political perception 
of the institution as the final interpreter of the Constitution. Therefore, the Supreme 
Court plays an important role in preserving the history and past both by adapting 
the stare decisis doctrine where it is possible, and by applying modern approaches 
towards constitutional interpretation in order to adjust the intent of the Framers to 
the changing social and political reality.
58 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
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